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HOMOSEXUALS, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND THE 
GUARANTEE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE NEW 
DECADE: AN OPTIMIST’S QUASI-SUSPECT VIEW OF 
RECENT EVENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON HEIGHTENED 





I. INTRODUCTION  
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),1 ―as applied to same-
sex couples who are legally married under state law, violates the 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.‖2  
―[C]lassifications based on sexual orientation warrant heightened 
scrutiny . . . .‖3  ―DOMA is unconstitutional.‖4  These statements nei-
 
* John Nicodemo earned his Juris Doctor from Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Cen-
ter in December 2011.  He has been honored to serve as Articles Editor of the Touro Law 
Review and to have stood alongside his brilliant colleagues.  John would especially like to 
thank Editor-in-Chief Ara Ayvazian and Managing Editor Lauren Morales, two people who 
have inspired him and gained both his unwavering respect and lifelong friendship. 
1 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).  The Defense of Marriage Act consists of merely one sentence, stat-
ing: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word ―marriage‖ means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word ―spouse‖ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a hus-
band or a wife. 
Id.  The act effectively prohibits any same-sex marriage from being recognized for federal 
purposes, and serves to allow states not to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other 
states.  See DOMA WATCH, http://www.domawatch.org/index.php (last visited March 18, 
2011). 
2 Memorandum from Att‘y Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Speaker of the House of Rep. John 
A. Boehner 1 (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with author). 
3 Id. at 2. 
4 Id. 
1
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ther reflect the mantras of a civil rights group nor echo the sound bi-
tes of a run-of-the-mill LGBT5 march on Washington.  These sen-
tences appear in an eloquently written letter by Attorney General Eric 
Holder to the Honorable John Boehner, the current Speaker of the 
House of Representatives.6  The aforementioned correspondence, 
dated February 23, 2011, reflects the Obama Administration‘s deci-
sion to cease defending DOMA—a legislative act that the Adminis-
tration finds unconstitutionally discriminatory.7  The decision arose 
because the Administration currently faces the task of defending 
DOMA against new lawsuits in federal circuits without binding 
precedent on whether rational basis review8 should be applied to sex-
ual orientation-based discrimination.9 
The Obama Administration‘s position on raising the standard 
of review from rational basis to heightened scrutiny for sexual orien-
tation-based discrimination resonated as an optimistic sign for the 
 
5 ―LGBT‖ is a socio-cultural categorical label that stands for ―Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual and 
Transgender.‖  See LGBT HELPLINE, http://www.lgbt.ie/information.aspx?contentid=84 (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2011).  Throughout this article, references to ―discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation‖ or ―discrimination against gays‖ apply to discrimination directed toward all 
members of the LGBT community. 
6 Memorandum from Att‘y Gen. Eric Holder, supra note 2, at 1-2; see also Elspeth Reeve, 
John Boehner Becomes Speaker of the House, THE ATLANTIC WIRE, (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011/01/john-boehner-becomes-speaker-of-the-
house/21632/ (stating that the Honorable John Boehner became Speaker of the House on 
January 5, 2011). 
7 See Memorandum from Att‘y Gen. Eric H. Holder, supra note 2, at 1 (―After careful 
consideration . . . the President of the United States has made the determination that . . . 
[DOMA] as applied to same-sex couples who are legally married under state law, violates 
the equal protection component under the Fifth Amendment.‖). 
8 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining the ―rational basis test‖ as ―[t]he 
criterion for judicial analysis of a statute that does not implicate a fundamental right or a 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause, 
whereby the court will uphold a law if it bears a reasonable relationship to the attainment of 
a legitimate governmental objective.  Rational basis is the most deferential of the standards 
of review that courts use in due-process and equal-protection analysis‖). 
9 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, 9, Windsor v. United States, 2010 WL 5647015 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 9, 2010) (No. 1:10-CV-08435) (asserting that DOMA should be unconstitutional as 
applied to estate tax in New York); Complaint at 1-2, Pedersen v. Office of Personnel 
Mgmt., 2010 WL 4483820 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010) (No. 3:10-CV-1750) (asserting that 
DOMA should be unconstitutional as applied to the FEHB federal program, ERISA benefits, 
Social Security lump-sum death benefits, the FMLA federal program, and the New Hamp-
shire Retirement System pension plan); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623, 631 
(1996) (―We have attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that, if a 
law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legis-
lative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.‖) (empha-
sis added). 
2
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gay community.10  Although President Barack Obama‘s decision in 
no way binds the Supreme Court to follow its directive,11 one cannot 
imagine that neither the Court nor Congress, whether these branches 
of government ultimately agree with the President‘s position, would 
wholly ignore his persuasive findings.  Gay rights groups may choose 
to rest their well-founded optimism on an extraordinarily progressive 
position from one of the three co-equal branches of the government. 
Eric Holder‘s letter, a monumental landmark in the struggle 
for rights within the LGBT community, proved to be one of many 
positive guideposts for the LGBT community in the years 2010 and 
2011.  Following Witt v. United States Department of the Air Force12 
and Log Cabin Republicans v. United States,13 two widely publicized 
Ninth Circuit challenges to the facially discriminatory military policy 
known as ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell,‖14 Congress, near the end of 2010, 
repealed ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell.‖15  Soon after, Perry v. Schwarze-
negger,16 another Ninth Circuit case, challenged the constitutionality 
of California‘s Proposition 8,17 a highly controversial ballot initiative 
that rendered same-sex marriage illegal.18  Although the Perry court, 
 
10 See Dan Froomkin, Gay Rights Advocates Celebrate Obama’s DOMA Turnaround, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2011, 5:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/23/ 
doma-unconstitutional-gay-rights-groups-celebrate_n_827355.html (―Gay rights groups 
celebrated President Obama‘s decision . . . to no longer defend the constitutionality of the 
1996 Defense of Marriage Act, which bans federal recognition of same-sex marriages.‖). 
11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting in Congress all legislative powers); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2, (binding the Court‘s jurisdiction ―under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make.‖). 
12 739 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
13 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
14 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed 2010); The ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ Act provided: 
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces 
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if . . . (1) That 
the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another 
to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . . (2) That the member has stated 
that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect . . . (3) 
That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to 
be of the same biological sex. 
Id. at § 654 (b)(1)-(3). 
15 See Carl Hulse, Senate Repeals Ban of Openly Gay Military Personnel, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Dec. 18, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/ 
19cong.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (―The Senate on Saturday [December 18, 2010] struck 
down the ban on gay men and lesbians openly serving in the military . . . .). 
16 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
17 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003. 
18 Id. (plainly stating that, ―[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or rec-
ognized in California.‖); see also Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (―Plaintiffs allege that 
3
Nicodemo: Homosexuals, Equal Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
288 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
in holding that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, clearly stated 
that ―the evidence presented at trial shows that gays and lesbians are 
the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to protect,‖19 its de-
cision rested on rational basis review.20  Perhaps by clearly pronounc-
ing that sexual orientation-based discrimination deserves a heigh-
tened standard of review, the court in Perry judicially nudged the 
Obama Administration. 
The question then becomes: ―Is any level of optimism among 
the LGBT community warranted?‖  The answer is a prudent and 
qualified ―yes.‖  Since the inception of the modern gay rights move-
ment in the late 1960‘s,21 members of the LGBT community have 
struggled for acceptance in the American mainstream.  During the 
past several decades, as strides have been made to secure basic civil 
rights for all Americans, the efforts of gay rights activists have been 
unavoidably impeded by vehement opposition.22  This opposition has 
generally been fueled by either moral or religious attitudes, and has 
most often surfaced to further political goals.23  Unlike other classes 
of citizens who encountered and defeated discriminatory adversity 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, constitutional rec-
ognition of the LGBT community as a protected class often seems 
unattainable.  When homosexuals make strides in the cause to 
achieve basic rights, legislatures seem to counter by enacting policies 
that present obstacles to realizing those strides.24 
 
Proposition 8 deprives them of due process and of equal protection of the laws contrary to 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that is enforcement by state officials violates 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.‖). 
19 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (emphasis added). 
20 See id. (―[T]he Equal Protection Clause renders Proposition 8 unconstitutional under 
any standard of review.‖). 
21 See Andrew Matzner, Stonewall Riots, GLBTQ: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GAY, LESBIAN, 
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER CULTURE, http://www.glbtq.com/social-
sciences/stonewall_riots.html; http://www.glbtq.com/social-sciences/stonewall_riots,2.html 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (providing an overview of the beginning of the gay rights move-
ment).  On June 27, 1969, entertainer Judy Garland died.  Id.  The next day, June 28, 1969, is 
understood to mark the beginning of the modern gay rights movement.  Id.  In the early 
morning hours of June 28, the police made one of their periodic raids of the Stonewall Inn, a 
gay bar in the Greenwich Village of New York City filled with a crowd presumably mourn-
ing the loss of gay icon Garland, and caused an eruption of fury.  Id.  This raid and subse-
quent riot became known as the ―Stonewall Rebellion.‖  Id. 
22 See RACHEL KRANZ & TIM CUSICK, GAY RIGHTS, 51-55 (Facts on File, Inc., rev. ed. 
2005) (providing an overview of the ―anti-gay rights movement‖ that has been perpetuated 
by religious and political factions since the inception of the gay rights movement). 
23 See id. 
24 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed 2010) (requiring that a member of the armed 
4
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Fourteenth Amendment scholars and enthusiasts have wit-
nessed a series of events in the years 2010 and 2011 that somehow 
indicate a potential for a change in the status of the LGBT communi-
ty in Equal Protection issues.25  Federal courts currently analyze con-
stitutional challenges for sexual orientation discrimination using a ra-
tional basis standard of review.26  A question arises as to whether the 
current socio-political climate precipitates a change.  Does the possi-
bility, or moreover, the probability, exist that the Supreme Court may 
raise the level of scrutiny afforded to sexual orientation based dis-
crimination claims within a few years?  Can it occur sooner?  Will 
the Court succumb to social pressure and social norms and provide 
legal constitutional protections to a visible and economically viable 
group of American citizens?  Moreover, will the LGBT community 
ever be afforded constitutional protections as a suspect or quasi-
suspect class27 for matters involving equal protection and guarantees 
of fundamental rights? 
This paper will examine the current state of constitutional 
protections accorded to the LGBT community.  Section II will ana-
lyze the factors determined by the Supreme Court to distinguish and 
 
forces be discharged for engaging or attempting to engage in homosexual acts, stating his 
homosexuality, or marrying a person of the same sex); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (mandating that 
marriage only applies to heterosexuals). 
25 See, e.g., Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (holding that 10 U.S.C. § 654 
violates the Equal Protection Clause because it serves no valid governmental interest); Witt, 
739 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (holding that 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 violates an Air Force nurse‘s due 
process rights); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (holding that California‘s Proposition 8 vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause); see also Hulse, supra note 15 (stating that the Senate‘s 
repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654 appeases the inferior treatment of homosexuals in the military); 
Memorandum from Att‘y Gen. Holder, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the Defense of Mar-
riage Act violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
26 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 942 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, noting that although it was the first time the Supreme Court struck 
down a discriminatory law against gays, the Court used only rational basis review to do so, 
not heightened scrutiny).  ―The rational basis test is the minimum level of scrutiny that all 
government actions . . . must meet . . . . [requiring] that a law meets the rational basis review 
if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.‖  Id. at 723.  ―There is a strong 
presumption in favor of laws that are challenged under the rational basis test.‖  Id. at 724. 
27 See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 
1990) (―To be a ‗suspect‘ or ‗quasi-suspect‘ class homosexuals must 1) have suffered a his-
tory of discrimination; 2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that 
define them as a discrete group; and 3) show that they are a minority or politically power-
less, or alternatively show that the statutory classification at issue burdens a fundamental 
right.‖ (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03, (1987))); see also United States v. 
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (―[P]rejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.‖). 
5
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identify classifications of citizens deserving heightened levels of 
scrutiny for constitutional equal protection challenges and apply 
those factors to the LGBT community as a class.  Recent and current 
federal court rulings, legislative actions (and inactions), socio-
political mores, and general statistics and facts regarding the LGBT 
community will reveal that sexual orientation, as a classification for 
equal protection, clearly warrants some level of heightened scrutiny.  
Section III provides a critical view regarding legislative and judicial 
refusal to accept same-sex marriage as a fundamental right guaran-
teed under Due Process.  Section IV focuses on recent Supreme Court 
decisions involving public and private sexual orientation-based dis-
crimination, and compares those cases with decisions involving race 
and gender discrimination by private associations.  The analysis will 
reveal that, although the Court refused to allow either race or gender 
discrimination, the Court has either permitted sexual orientation dis-
crimination or ignored the issue altogether.  Section V will discuss 
the ways in which changing social mores regarding social classes of 
Americans has led to judicial and legislative attention for the protec-
tion of such classes.  The question remains whether history regarding 
the link between social change and constitutional protections will 
prevail for the LGBT community.  After having considered and 
weighed all the factors regarding the possibility (and probability) of 
constitutional protections for the LGBT community, the outcome of 
this paper promises to be less foreboding and more optimistic—that 
is, cautiously optimistic. 
 
II. CLASSIFICATIONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION: SUSPECT, 
QUASI-SUSPECT, GAY—DESCENDING LEVELS OF EQUALITY 
 
Currently, federal courts analyze constitutional challenges 
based on sexual orientation discrimination using a rational basis stan-
dard of review.28  Presently, sexual orientation as a class of citizens 
fails to warrant either a suspect or a quasi-suspect classification for 
matters of discrimination.29  Therefore, constitutional challenges to 
 
28 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32 (noting that alleged sexual orientation discrimination is 
to be analyzed using a rational basis review). 
29 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 936 (noting that although sexual orientation dis-
crimination has similarities to other forms of discrimination which warrant heightened scru-
6
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governmental actions designed to discriminate against the LGBT 
community require the government to show that the challenged ac-
tion was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.30  
Under the rational basis standard of review, federal courts give great 
deference to the legislatures, and thus challenges to alleged discrimi-
natory governmental action, when this standard is employed, usually 
fail.31 
The federal courts determine the level of review to constitu-
tional challenges depending on whether the class challenging the go-
vernmental action warrants heightened scrutiny.32  The Supreme 
Court recognizes these suspect or quasi-suspect classes based on spe-
cific characteristics of the class.33  Logically, federal courts are highly 
suspicious of legislative actions that serve to either prevent a member 
of a suspect class from realizing a fundamental right or deprive a 
member of a suspect class from the equal protections of the law.34  
Classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage warrant 
strict scrutiny, for which governmental actions against these classes 
require the legislature to meet a ―rigid‖ and strict standard of re-
view.35  This strict scrutiny standard requires the legislature to meet 
an onerous burden of proving that the challenged legislation is either 
necessary or narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental in-
terest.36  Classifications based on gender warrant mid-level scrutiny, 
for which the legislature must demonstrate an ―exceedingly persua-
 
tiny, such alleged discrimination requires only rational basis review). 
30 Id. at 723 (discussing the requirements to satisfy the rational basis test). 
31 Id. at 724. 
32 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (―Classifica-
tions based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.  Unless they are strictly reserved for 
remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics 
of racial hostility.‖); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict 
scrutiny to discrimination based on national origin, specifically Japanese internment during 
World War II). 
33 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-43 (1985), (discussing 
some of the factors the Supreme Court used to make determinations as to which groups are 
labeled as ―suspect‖ or ―quasi-suspect‖ classes). 
34 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (―[C]lassifications based on alie-
nage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judi-
cial scrutiny.‖). 
35 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216; Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440. 
36 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (―Federal racial classifi-
cations, like those of a state, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.‖). 
7
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sive justification‖ for an important governmental interest.37 
The Court has determined several factors based on the charac-
teristics of a classification of citizens to evaluate whether the group 
necessitates status as a suspect class, and thereby establish the level 
of scrutiny applied for constitutional challenges to governmental ac-
tions.  Therefore, in order for the LGBT community to warrant a 
heightened level of scrutiny, it naturally must conform to the stan-
dards set forth by the Court as applied to race, national origin, non-
citizenry, and gender. 
To be a suspect or quasi-suspect class, ―homosexuals 
must 1) have suffered a history of discrimination; 2) 
exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing charac-
teristics that define them as a discrete group; and 3) 
show that they are a minority or politically powerless, 
or alternatively show that the statutory classification at 
issue burdens a fundamental right.‖38 
A suspect classification characteristic is: 
[A]n immutable characteristic determined solely by 
the accident of birth . . . [that] frequently bears no rela-
tion to ability to perform or contribute to society . . . 
[and should not be subject to the] imposition of special 
disabilities upon the members of a particular [class] 
because [it] . . . would seem to violate ―the basic con-
cept of our system that legal burdens should bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility.‖39 
A. Sexual Orientation and a History of Discrimination 
 
History reveals that classifications based on race, national 
origin, and gender clearly warrant the heightened scrutiny afforded 
them in matters of discrimination and fundamental rights.40  A history 
 
37 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (―Parties who seek to defend gend-
er-based government action must demonstrate an ‗exceedingly persuasive justification‘ for 
that action.‖). 
38 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573. 
39 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
40 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625-26 (1984) (stating that a 
Minnesota statute that served to eliminate gender discrimination demonstrates that the legis-
8
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of discrimination suffered by groups based on such classifications 
represents an important factor in determining whether to use either 
strict or heightened scrutiny for equal protection challenges.  Howev-
er, one cannot discount the staggering history of discrimination en-
dured by the LGBT community, a pattern that continues to this day 
without sufficient constitutional protection. 
The LGBT community currently faces a pressing need for le-
gal recognition from the courts.  Americans need not identify as 
LGBT to fully understand the struggle.  Statistics indicate that offi-
cial recognition of sexual orientation as a protected class falls short 
from a national perspective.41  Only twenty-five states protect sexual 
orientation in employment discrimination practices for both public 
and private employers, while five states prohibit discrimination in 
public workplaces only.42  Thirty-seven states currently prohibit 
same-sex marriage or civil unions43 by defining marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman, while only six states (and the Dis-
trict of Columbia) have enacted legislation specifically allowing 
same-sex marriage.44  Legislative and judicial action, and inaction, 
perpetuate the intolerance that members of the LGBT community en-
counter each day.  Equal protection under the law continues to appear 
an unattainable goal. 
Stigmatization, as experienced by those within the LGBT 
 
lature recognized the importance of removing barriers to economic and societal equality); 
see also John E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial Minorities, 
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 349 (1995) (underscoring and highlighting the shifting posi-
tions of the Supreme Court in relation to matters of racial discrimination); Juan F. Perea, 
Ethnicity and Prejudice: Re-evaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 
35 WM. & MARY L. REV 805, 806-07 (1994) (―In the United States, often we have not treated 
strangers as we have treated our native born.‖); DO SOMETHING, http://www.dosomething. 
org/tipsandtools/background-racial-discrimination (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (summarizing 
discriminatory practices against various racial and ethnic minority groups in the Unites 
States). 
41 Your Rights Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace, 
FINDLAW.COM, http://employment.findlaw.com/employment/employment-employee-discri 
mination-harassment/employment-employee-gay-lesbian-discrimination/ (last visited Octo-
ber 3, 2011). 
42 Id. 
43 See Tom Head, Civil Unions, ABOUT.COM, http://www.civilliberty.about.com/ 
od/gendersexuality/g/civil_unions.htm (―Civil unions are legal contracts between partners 
that are recognized by a state or government as conferring all or some of the rights conferred 
by marriage, but without the implicit historical and religious meaning associated with the 
word ‗marriage.‘ ‖) (last visited October 3, 2011). 
44 Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last visited Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tab 
id=16430 (listing the current legislation, or lack thereof, in each state). 
9
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community, often leads to unfortunate social consequences.45  For 
example, violence against gays is on the rise, with more reported in-
cidents each year.46  Because of intolerance of their sexual orienta-
tions, several young people committed suicide in the year 2010 
alone.47  An atmosphere of anti-gay rhetoric continues to permeate 
the platforms of political candidates who put forth gay rights as a 
wedge issue to seek votes from like-minded constituents.48  Protec-
tions not only against discrimination, but also for physical and emo-
tional safety, warrant obvious and immediate attention from the legis-
latures and the courts. 
 
B. Sexual Orientation—Immutable? 
 
The word ―immutable‖ simply means unchangeable.49  Immu-
tability within a class of citizens constitutes a major factor in deter-
mining whether a class is either suspect or quasi-suspect; as the Su-
preme Court has stated, a person should not suffer discrimination 
―determined solely by the accident of birth.‖50 
In 1990, twenty years before the groundbreaking cases of 
2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case challenging the 
constitutionality of allegedly unfair employment screenings of homo-
sexuals in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance 
Office.51  Here, the Petitioners claimed that the United States De-
 
45 See Ramon Johnson, Hate Crimes Motivated by Sexual Orientation Bias, ABOUT.COM: 
GAY LIFE, http://www.gaylife.about.com/od/hatecrimes/a/statistics.htm (stating that the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigations, under the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, reported that hate crimes 
based on sexual orientation bias increased from 1,415 reported cases in 2006 to 1,617 re-
ported cases in 2008) (last visited October 3, 2011). 
46 See id. 
47 See Raymond Chase Commits Suicide, Fifth Gay Teen to Take Life in Three Weeks, 
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM, (Oct. 1, 2010 1:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/ 
10/01/raymond-chase-suicide_n_746989.html (―Many consider this - - the fifth suicide by a 
young gay person in the past few weeks - - as a national call to action.‖). 
48 See Amy Beth Arkawy, Political Anti-gay Rhetoric Fuels Anti-gay Violence, NEWS 
JUNKIE POST, (Oct 11, 2010 2:28 PM), http://www.newsjunkiepost.com/2010/10/11/political-
anti-gay-rhetoric-fuels-anti-gay-violence/ (―[P]oliticians are openly denouncing the ‗gay 
lifestyle‘ and campaigning on keeping gay teachers out of schools.‖). 
49 Immutable Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/imm 
utable (last visited October 3, 2011). 
50 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
51 895 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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partment of Defense violated their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights of equal protection.52  The district court, after its analysis of the 
equal protection challenge, found for the plaintiffs holding that ―gay 
people are a ‗quasi-suspect class‘ entitled to heightened scrutiny.‖53  
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and stated that 
It is apparent that while the Supreme Court has identi-
fied that legislative classifications based on race, alie-
nage, or national origin are subject to strict scrutiny 
and that classifications based upon gender or illegiti-
macy call for a heightened standard, the Court has 
never held homosexuality to a heightened standard of 
review.54 
Although the Ninth Circuit found that ―homosexuals [had] suffered a 
history of discrimination,‖ it stated that, ―we do not believe that they 
meet the other criteria.  Homosexuality is not an immutable characte-
ristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits 
such as race, gender, or alienage.‖55 
Twenty years after High Tech Gays, the Ninth Circuit pro-
duced Perry v. Schwarzenegger, a groundbreaking case for both its 
outcome and its dicta regarding the characteristic of homosexuality.  
When deciding the issue of whether evidence showed California had 
an interest in ―differentiating between same-sex and opposite-sex un-
ions,‖ the court explicitly stated that, ―[s]exual orientation is com-
monly discussed as a characteristic of the individual.  Sexual orienta-
tion is fundamental to a person’s identity and is a distinguishing 
characteristic that defines gays and lesbians as a discrete group.‖56  
Most notable is the following assertion that the court adopted: ―Indi-
viduals do not generally choose their sexual orientation.  No credible 
evidence supports a finding that an individual may, through con-
scious decision, therapeutic intervention or any other method, change 
 
52 Id. at 565, 569. 
53 Id. at 565 (quoting High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Off., 668 F. Supp. 
1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1987)). 
54 Id. at 573. 
55 Id. (emphasis added). 
56 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 963-64 (emphasis added) (citing evidence proffered by Gre-
gory Herek, a professor of psychology at U.C. Davis).  Herek, a psychologist, specializing in 
social psychology (―the intersection of psychology and sociology‖ that ―focuses on human 
behavior within a social context . . .‖), whose ―dissertation focused on heterosexuals‘ atti-
tudes toward lesbians and gay men . . . [,] teaches a course on sexual orientation and preju-
dice.‖  Id. at 943. 
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his or her sexual orientation.‖57 
In Perry, the court explicitly adopted a social psychologist‘s 
statement regarding the characteristics of gays and lesbians.58  In ad-
dition to dispelling the long-held prejudicial beliefs regarding the 
moral inferiority of gays and lesbians to non-gays, the court boldly 
pronounced that homosexuality is, in all likelihood, immutable.59  In 
other words, homosexuals are born that way.  This statement is logi-
cally paralleled by the findings of two independent studies determin-
ing that prejudice of homosexuals is born from outdated and errone-
ous misconceptions.60  The court‘s opinion furthers the need for other 
jurisdictions to understand that, like race and gender, sexual orienta-
tion deserves constitutional protection from discrimination. 
 
C. Homosexuals and Political Power? 
 
Traditionally, in determining political powerlessness in rela-
tion to suspectness, the Supreme Court has held that a class must be 
―relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.‖61  Additionally, the Court has alluded to the fact that politi-
cal powerlessness results from a class having ―no ability to attract the 
attention of the lawmakers,‖62 thereby meriting judicial suspicion re-
garding legislative actions. 
Even though Congress, at the end of 2010, repealed ―Don‘t 
Ask, Don‘t Tell,‖ DOMA still stands as an obstacle to same-sex mar-
 
57 Id. at 966 (emphasis added).  ―Herek has conducted research in which he has found that 
the vast majority of lesbians and gay men, and most bisexuals as well, when asked how 
much choice they have about their sexual orientation say that they have ‗no choice‘ or ‗very 
little choice‘ about it.‖  Id. 
58 See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (concluding in part from David Herek‘s extensive 
study). 
59 Id. at 966. 
60 Historian George Chauncey warned that ancient stereotypes depicting gays as criminals 
based on the criminalization of homosexual conduct in the twentieth century fostered dis-
crimination.  Id. at 937.  Political scientist Gary Segura testified that discrimination against 
gays was manifested in laws and policies, and the negative stereotypes served to limit the 
political rights of the LGBT community.  Id.  ―It‘s very difficult to engage in the give-and[-
]take of the legislative process when [people] think you are an inherently bad person.  That‘s 
just not the basis for compromise and negotiation in the political process.‖  Id. 
61 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
62 Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.at 445. 
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riage in the United States.  Federal, state, and local legislatures seem 
less than hard-pressed to enact legislation that would serve to protect 
the LGBT community both in the workplace and in public.63  State 
legislatures overwhelmingly refuse to entertain the possibility of 
same-sex marriage or civil unions.64  Moreover, politicians regularly 
spew anti-gay rhetoric during election campaigns to garner votes 
from those who find homosexuality morally reprehensible.65  The 
current state invariably proves that the LGBT community remains 
politically powerless. 
 
D. Does Homosexuality Bear any Relation to Ability? 
 
―[W]hat differentiates sex from such non-suspect statuses as 
intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized 
suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no rela-
tion to ability to perform or contribute to society.‖66  This factor con-
tributes to determining whether a class is suspect or quasi-suspect.  In 
contrast, the Court has alternatively held that characteristics such as 
intelligence and physical disabilities constitute non-suspect statuses.67 
The feature that distinguishes members of the LGBT commu-
nity from the community at large pertains to sexual orientation, a cha-
racteristic having no bearing on a person‘s ability.  Nor does sexual 
orientation determine the overall moral character of an individual or 
an individual‘s ability to lead a productive life.  According to Presi-
dent Obama, ― ‗it is time to recognize that sacrifice, valor, and integr-
ity are no more defined by sexual orientation than they are by race or 
gender, religion or creed.‘ ‖68 
 
63 See supra notes 41 and 45 (underscoring the lack of uniform statewide workplace pro-
tections throughout the United States as well as the pressing need for general protections 
against bias crimes). 
64 See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, supra note 44 (stat-
ing that ―[o]ver half the states have passed legislation defining marriage between a man and 
a woman in their state constitutions‖). 
65 See Arkawy, supra note 48 (stating that politicians will attack gays in order to win the 
family values voters). 
66 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. 
67 See id. at 686-87 (differentiating non-suspect classes from the suspect class of gender, 
especially pertaining to women). 
68 NPR Staff and Wires, Senate Votes to Repeal ‗Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,‘ NPR, (Dec. 18, 
2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/18/132164172/-dont-ask-dont-tell-clears-vital-hurdle. 
13
Nicodemo: Homosexuals, Equal Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
298 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
 
E. Do these Factors Raise Sexual Orientation to the 
Level of ‘Suspect Class’ Status? 
 
An analysis of the factors pertaining to the characteristics of 
the LGBT community as a class clearly indicates that equal protec-
tion challenges to governmental legislation require some form of 
heightened scrutiny.  As Judge Vaughn Walker clearly explained in 
Perry, ―gays and lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny was 
designed to protect.‖69 
The question of whether the Court will ever address the issue 
of raising the level of scrutiny for matters of equal protection natural-
ly follows.  As recently as the 2009-2010 Term, the Court granted 
certiorari to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,70 a case dealing with 
sexual orientation-based discrimination.71  Gay rights advocates 
looked to the Martinez decision with particular anticipation; specula-
tion persisted that the Court‘s granting certiorari pointed to decidedly 
political motivations.72  However, the issue of equal protection never 
surfaced in the Court‘s opinion.73 
Similarly, in 2003, the Court explicitly avoided an opportuni-
 
69 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997. 
70 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
71 Id. at 2978.  In Martinez, the Christian Legal Society, a faith-based registered student 
organization with local law school chapters throughout the country, sought to prevent stu-
dents whose religious and moral beliefs differed from those prescribed by the student organ-
ization.  Id. at 2980.  In 2004, Society‘s chapter at the University of California—Hastings 
School of Law adopted a Statement of Faith, which required each member to abide by spe-
cific Christian-based tenets; non-Christians and those that engaged in ―unrepentant homo-
sexual conduct‖ failed to meet the newly established guidelines.  Id.  The Christian Legal 
Society directly claimed that the constitution allowed discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion by asserting a First Amendment right to free speech, free association, and the freedom to 
exercise their religion.  Id at 2981.  Although the Court necessarily addressed the issue of 
First Amendment free association and applied its analysis to Martinez, Justice Ginsberg, in 
her majority opinion, failed to speak directly to the issues of equal protection and discrimina-
tion against gays, which was the basis for the case.  See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985-86 
(―[Finding an alternative way] to conclude that [the] limited-public-forum precedents supply 
the appropriate framework for assessing both CLS‘s speech and association rights.‖). 
72 See Nan Hunter, Will the Supreme Court Grant Cert in Christian Legal Society Case?, 
HUNTER OF JUSTICE (Nov. 13, 2009, 10:33 AM), http://hunterforjustice.typepad.com 
/hunter_of_justice/christian-legal-society-litigation/page/2/ (―Clearly, someone on the Court 
is interested in granting cert: the case has been on the Court‘s conference calendar five times 
(counting today), but still no decision on cert has been announced.‖). 
73 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985-86. 
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 1, Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss1/11
2012 HOMOSEXUALS, EQUAL PROTECTION 299 
ty to address the rights of homosexuals as a protected class against 
discrimination in Lawrence v. Texas,74 a case regarding the constitu-
tionality of sodomy laws.75  In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy 
made clear that the Lawrence decision would give no guidance re-
garding the government‘s view of the Petitioner‘s homosexual life-
style.76  As such, Martinez, several years following Lawrence, pre-
sented a novel opportunity for the Court to address the missing 
―guidance‖ from the Lawrence decision.  However, this ―guidance‖ 
never came. 
Considering that sexual orientation as a class, similar to race 
and national origin, clearly qualifies for heightened status, the Court 
logically should espouse a compelling reason for what seems to be its 
avoidance of the issue.  Neither political motivations nor moral re-
probation constitute a compelling or important reason for the Court‘s 
avoidance.  Anti-majoritarian Article III judges receive Presidential 
appointments and Senate confirmations; they are constitutionally 
spared the political process.77  Therefore, unlike legislators that con-
tinually seek re-election, federal judges (including Supreme Court 
Justices) enjoy the freedom to interpret federal and constitutional law 
absent pressure from constituents seeking to inject moral persuasion 
into the government. 
Public moral disapproval of homosexuality on behalf of the 
Justices would controvert the Court‘s 1996 decision in Romer v. 
Evans.78  In Romer, the Court invalidated a Colorado statute that fa-
cially prohibited protections to any members of the LGBT communi-
ty.79  Applying rational basis analysis to the legislative action, the 
Court expressly held that Colorado‘s proffered interest in enacting 
the statute—protecting ―the liberties of landlords and employers who 
have personal or religious objections to homosexuality‖—failed to 
 
74 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
75 Id. at 563 (Petitioners were arrested for violating a Texas statute that provided, ―A per-
son commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of 
the same sex.‖). 
76 Id. at 578 (―[The present case] does not involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual person‘s seek to enter.‖). 
77 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2 (―[The President] shall have power, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate . . . to appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court . . . .‖). 
78 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
79 Id. at 635-36.  The state of Colorado adopted an Amendment to its Constitution that 
served to eliminate all anti-discriminatory protections to the class of people known as ―ho-
mosexual, lesbian, or bisexual . . . .‖  Id. at 624.  Under the Amendment, sexual-orientation 
based discrimination could not be prohibited by any local governments within the state.  Id. 
15
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rise to the level of a legitimate interest.80  ― ‗[I]f the constitutional 
conception of ‗equal protection of the laws‘ means anything, it must 
at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically un-
popular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.‘ 
‖81  Therefore, if the Court refused to allow a state to oppress a ―mo-
rally unpopular‖ group, then the idea that our Supreme Court would 
deny protective status to a group based on personal moral views 
seems hypocritical, repugnant, and ironically, immoral. 
 
III. THE RIGHT TO MARRY; JUST HOW FUNDAMENTAL IS IT? 
 
Few current socio-political issues spur the level of controver-
sy that marriage equality evokes.82  Since the outcome of Goodridge 
v. Department of Public Health,83 the groundbreaking case that lega-
lized same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, several additional states 
have allowed same-sex marriage while many states have effectively 
banned it.84  Public debate over the issue seemingly never ceases, 
with human rights activists advocating for marriage equality while 
conservative groups echo the unavoidable language of DOMA that 
defines marriage as a union between ―one man and one woman.‖  Na-
turally the question arises as to the core of the controversy: Why does 
the LGBT community seek marriage equality?  Does the answer re-
flect a longing within the community for equality?  Does the desire 
for equal protection arise from the myriad of legal protections that 
marriage affords or the simple desire to engage in an institution 
 
80 Id. at 633, 635. 
81 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Dep‘t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
82 See e.g., Tom Curry, A Guide to the Marriage Furor, MSNBC.COM, (July 14, 2004, 1:54 
PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4473785/ns/us_news-same-sex_marriage/ (―The status 
of marriage has become a major issue in this year‘s presidential and congressional races.‖); 
Joe Messerli, Should Same Sex Marriage Be Legalized, BALANCED POLITICS.ORG, 
http://www.balancedpolitics.org/same_sex_marriages.htm (last updated Mar. 24, 2009) 
(―Many areas of the country such as San Francisco have performed marriage ceremonies in 
defiance of the law.  Lost in all the legal battles and political maneuvering is the basic ques-
tion ‗[s]hould we allow gay couples to legally marry?‘ ‖); Tim Rutten, Both Sides in the 
Same Sex Marriage Controversy Need to Cool Down, LATIMES.COM, (Nov. 15, 2008), 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-rutten15-2008nov15,0,5322261.column (dis-
cussing Proposition 8 and the passionate, and sometimes counter-productive, divide it caused 
in California). 
83 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
84 See Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, supra note 44. 
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deemed to be fundamental?  Perhaps the answer encompasses all of 
the above. 
The right to marry has been deemed a fundamental right con-
stitutionally protected by the Due Process Clause.85  ―The freedom to 
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights es-
sential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.‖86  ―Marriage 
is one of ‗the basic civil rights of man . . . .‘ ‖87  Similar to discrimi-
nation against ―discrete and insular‖ minorities, government action 
designed to infringe upon a fundamental right generally must meet 
heightened scrutiny to pass constitutional muster—that is, the go-
vernmental action must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
purpose.88  Therefore, because the Court interpreted marriage to be a 
fundamental right and fundamental constitutional rights presumably 
apply to all citizens, this logical assumption leads to the conclusion 
that marriage rights extend to gays. 
However, fundamental rights are not absolute.  The Court has 
stated that, ―reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere 
with decisions to enter into a marital relationship may legitimately be 
imposed.‖89  Additionally, the lower court in Goodridge provided the 
classic reasons that state governments proffer to justify denying 
same-sex couples the right to marry.90  The Massachusetts high court, 
 
85 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (―These statutes also deprive the Lovings 
of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.‖).  In Loving, an interracial couple sought to avoid criminal prosecution 
based on a Virginia statute that criminalized interracial marriage.  Id. at 2-3.  The Court, in 
striking down the statute as violating the Lovings‘ Due Process rights, stated, ―[t]o deny this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in 
these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State‘s citizens of liberty without due 
process of law.‖  Id. at 12. 
86 Id. 
87 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942)). 
88 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (―Prejudice 
against . . . discrete and insular minorities . . . [require] a correspondingly more searching 
judicial inquiry.‖); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (stating that 
fundamental liberties protected by the Due Process Clause, including the right to marry, can-
not be infringed upon unless the government action is ― ‗narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest.‘ ‖ (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
89 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. 
90 In Goodridge, fourteen Massachusetts citizens filed suit after they sought marriage li-
censes to marry their same-sex partners and were summarily denied by the Department of 
Public Health.  798 N.E.2d at 949-50.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re-
counted the findings of the Superior Court judge, who relied upon classic examples of go-
vernmental reasoning used in denying same-sex marriage: 
17
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in applying rational basis review,91 examined the three rationales of-
fered by the state to defend denying marriage rights to the same-sex 
couples—‖(1) providing a ‗favorable setting for procreation‘; (2) en-
suring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the Department of 
Public Health defined as ‗a two-parent family with one parent of each 
sex‘; and (3) preserving scarce State and private financial re-
sources‖92—and invalidated each one.93  The court then grappled with 
 
[T]he marriage exclusion does not offend the liberty, freedom, equality, 
or due process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, and that the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not guarantee ―the fundamen-
tal right to marry a person of the same sex.‖  He concluded that prohibit-
ing same-sex marriage rationally furthers the Legislature‘s legitimate in-
terest in safeguarding the ―primary purpose‖ of marriage, ―procreation.‖  
The Legislature may rationally limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, 
he concluded, because those couples are ―theoretically . . . capable of 
procreation,‖ they do not rely on ―inherently more cumbersome‖ non-
coital means of reproduction, and they are more likely than same-sex 
couples to have children, or more children. 
Id. at 951.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted certiorari on appeal.  Id. 
91 Id. at 960 (―Under both the equality and liberty guarantees, regulatory authority must, at 
very least, serve ‗a legitimate purpose in a rational way‘; a statute must ‗bear a reasonable 
relation to a permissible legislative objective.‘ ‖ (quoting Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles, 596 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Mass. 1992))). 
92 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. 
93 The Massachusetts high court vehemently disagreed with the lower court in equating 
marriage with procreation by firmly stating that: 
If procreation were a necessary component of civil marriage, our statutes 
would draw a tighter circle around the permissible bounds of nonmarital 
child bearing and the creation of families by noncoital means.  The at-
tempt to isolate procreation as the ―source of a fundamental right to mar-
ry‖ overlooks the integrated way in which courts have examined the 
complex and overlapping realms of personal autonomy, marriage, family 
life, and child rearing.  Our jurisprudence recognizes that, in these 
nuanced and fundamentally private areas of life, such a narrow focus is 
inappropriate. 
Id. at 962 (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 987 (Cordy, J., dissenting)) (internal citations 
omitted).  As to the state‘s second rationale, the court held that: 
The department has offered no evidence that forbidding marriage to 
people of the same sex will increase the number of couples choosing to 
enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have and raise children.  
There is thus no rational relationship between the marriage statute and 
the Commonwealth‘s proffered goal of protecting the ―optimal‖ child 
rearing unit.  Moreover, the department readily concede[d] that people in 
same-sex couples may be ―excellent‖ parents. 
Id. at 963.  As for the third rationale, the court held: 
An absolute statutory ban on same-sex marriage bears no rational rela-
tionship to the goal of economy.  First, the department‘s conclusory ge-
neralization-that same-sex couples are less financially dependent on each 
18
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the notion that same-sex marriage would somehow ―trivialize or de-
stroy the institution of marriage as it has historically been fa-
shioned[]‖ by brilliantly stating that, ―the plaintiffs seek only to be 
married, not to undermine the institution of civil marriage.‖94 
Recognizing the right of an individual to marry a per-
son of the same sex will not diminish the validity or 
dignity of opposite-sex marriage, any more than re-
cognizing the right of an individual to marry a person 
of a different race devalues the marriage of a person 
who marries someone of her own race.  If anything, 
extending civil marriage to same-sex couples rein-
forces the importance of marriage to individuals and 
communities.  That same-sex couples are willing to 
embrace marriage‘s solemn obligations of exclusivity, 
mutual support, and commitment to one another is a 
testament to the enduring place of marriage in our 
laws and in the human spirit.95 
In 2009, six years after Goodridge, a group of plaintiffs from 
California filed suit in a federal district court in California challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a voter-enacted ban on same-sex marriage 
(―Proposition 8‖) in Perry v. Schwarzenegger.96  In November 2000, 
California voters adopted the California Defense of Marriage Act, 
amending the state‘s Family Code to read, ―Only marriage between a 
man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.‖97  In Febru-
ary 2004, San Francisco began ―issu[ing] marriage licenses to same-
sex couples[,;]‖ and one month later, the California Supreme Court 
issued an injunction preventing the mayor of San Francisco from con-
 
other than opposite-sex couples-ignores that many same-sex couples, 
such as many of the plaintiffs in this case, have children and other de-
pendents (here, aged parents) in their care.  Second, Massachusetts mar-
riage laws do not condition receipt of public and private financial bene-
fits to married individuals on a demonstration of financial dependence on 
each other; the benefits are available to married couples regardless of 
whether they mingle their finances or actually depend on each other for 
support. 
Id. at 964. 
94 Id. at 965 (footnotes omitted). 
95 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965. 
96 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927-28. 
97 Id. at 927. 
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tinuing the practice.98 
Subsequently, the city of San Francisco initiated legal action 
in superior court, challenging the constitutionality of the California 
Defense of Marriage Act.99  In May 2008, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia invalidated the Act, holding that it violated the equal protec-
tion guarantee of the California Constitution.100  As a result, approx-
imately eighteen thousand same-sex couples were granted marriage 
licenses from June until November of 2008, when Proposition 8 took 
effect.101  Federal court litigation then ensued with Perry. 
Initially, when proponents of Proposition 8 campaigned for its 
passage prior to the November 2008 statewide election, the message 
to advance the Proposition echoed a tone of moral superiority.102  
However, because the proponents of the Act realized that only secu-
lar purposes legally justify constitutional scrutiny, the defendants in 
Perry eliminated the language referring to the moral superiority of 
opposite-sex couples employed during the election campaign.103  
Nevertheless, the proponents‘ evidence consisted mainly of an expert 
who testified that, ―marriage is either a socially approved sexual rela-
 
98 Id. at 928. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928. 
102 See id. at 930 (―The advertisements conveyed to voters that same-sex relationships are 
inferior to opposite-sex relationships and dangerous to children.‖).  During the campaign, the 
key premises of Proposition 8 contained the following messages: 
1. Denial of marriage to same-sex couples preserves marriage; 2. Denial 
of marriage to same-sex couples allows gays and lesbians to live private-
ly without requiring others, including (perhaps especially) children, to 
recognize or acknowledge the existence of same-sex couples; 3. Denial 
of marriage to same-sex couples protects children; 4. The ideal child-
rearing environment requires one male parent and one female parent; 5. 
Marriage is different in nature depending on the sex of the spouses, and 
an opposite-sex couple‘s marriage is superior to a same-sex couple‘s 
marriage; and 6. Same-sex couples‘ marriages redefine opposite-sex 
couples‘ marriages. 
Id. 
103 Id. at 931.  The argument for the defense at trial asserted that the Act: 
1. Maintains California‘s definition of marriage as excluding same-sex 
couples; 2. Affirms the will of California citizens to exclude same-sex 
couples from marriage; 3. Promotes stability in relationships between a 
man and a woman because they naturally (and at times unintentionally) 
produce children; and 4. Promotes ―statistically optimal‖ child-rearing 
households; that is, households in which children are raised by a man 
and a woman married to each other. 
Id. 
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tionship between a man and a woman for the purpose of bearing and 
raising children who are biologically related to both spouses or a pri-
vate relationship between two consenting adults.‖104 
The court presented the parties the task of ―identify[ing] a dif-
ference between heterosexuals and homosexuals that the government 
might fairly need to take into account when crafting legislation.‖105  
The proponents of Proposition 8 only offered evidence that opposite-
sex couples can procreate whereas same-sex couples cannot, but of-
fered no basis for the government‘s considering fertility while draft-
ing legislation.106  Judge Walker stated that, ―No evidence at trial il-
luminated distinctions among lesbians, gay men and heterosexuals 
amounting to ‗real and undeniable differences‘ that the government 
might need to take into account in legislating.‖107 
Goodridge and Perry both provided crystal clear examples of 
the usual ad hoc ―legitimate interests‖ that states advance to thwart 
same-sex marriage, as well as insightful examinations of the failure 
of those proffered interests in both state and federal challenges.108  
Perhaps these two cases suggest that courts, in examining challenges 
to same-sex marriage, may no longer rely upon traditional interests to 
prevent same sex couples from marrying.  In any event, Goodridge 
and Perry proved that, even in the absence of determining whether 
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right provided by the Constitu-
tion, rational basis analysis does not portend ultimate defeat for mar-
riage equality. 
 
104 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 933.  David Blankenhorn provided the socio-political expert 
testimony for the proponents and, ultimately, the court found Blankenhorn‘s testimony to be 
unreliable and held that California has an interest in defining marriage as a union between 
one man and one woman.  Id. at 934. 
105 Id. at 997. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (listing the three rationales the legislature used for 
prohibiting same-sex marriage); Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 998-1002 (enumerating and dis-
cussing the rationales set forth in enacting Proposition 8).  The Perry court listed the follow-
ing rationales for Proposition 8: 
Proponents put forth several rationales for Proposition 8 . . . :  (1) reserv-
ing marriage as a union between a man and a woman and excluding any 
other relationship from marriage; (2) proceeding with caution when im-
plementing social changes; (3) promoting opposite-sex parenting over 
same-sex parenting; (4) protecting the freedom of those who oppose 
marriage for same-sex couples; (5) treating same-sex couples differently 
from opposite-sex couples; and (6) any other conceivable interest. 
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
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However, even though the Constitution guarantees the fun-
damental right to marry and both federal and state courts have sum-
marily dismissed reasons for preventing same-sex marriage as illegi-
timate in Perry and Goodridge, the question arises as to whether 
same-sex marriage, as distinguished from ―traditional‖ marriage, 
warrants constitutional protection.  The federally authorized stum-
bling block known as DOMA presents an unavoidable problem.  
Considering that DOMA textually defines marriage as ―a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,‖109 the ques-
tion arises as to whether same-sex marriage, distinguished from mar-
riage in general, constitutes a fundamental right at all.  Although 
same-sex marriage proponents may turn to American history for a 
myriad of examples showing that the definition of marriage has un-
dergone several cultural changes,110 has Congress‘ definitive defini-
tion of marriage in DOMA effectively determined the traditional 
meaning of the institution? 
Coupled with this dilemma for proponents of marriage equali-
ty lies the history and tradition of the Supreme Court in elucidating 
the history and tradition of our nation.  The Court has construed fun-
damental liberties to be those that are deeply rooted in the ― ‗tradi-
tions and (collective) conscience of our people‘ to determine whether 
a principle is ‗so rooted (there) as to be ranked as fundamental.‘ ‖111  
Members of the Court have further suggested that there is a ―limita-
tion on the concept of liberty[,]‖ and ―this limitation [is found] in 
‗tradition.‘ ‖112   
Further, the Court has firmly stated that ―[it is] refer[ring] to 
the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or de-
nying protection to, [an] asserted right can be identified.‖113  Specific 
traditions supersede general traditions.114  In other words, because 
 
109 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
110 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 966-67 (reviewing the history of the constructs of mar-
riage throughout the last century and a half and determining that the definition of marriage 
has survived many changes, including the abolition of anti-miscegenation laws, the end of 
treating wives as property, and the enactment of no-fault divorce). 
111 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (quoting Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (alterations in original)). 
112 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing the plurality‘s use of historical tradition relating to fundamental rights, namely, in this 
case, the right of a natural father to parent his child). 
113 Id. at 127, n.6. 
114 See id. (reasoning that the rights of ―a natural father of a child adulterously conceived‖ 
are not protected by any societal tradition that offers rights to these types of fathers). 
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traditional marriage specifically dictates a union between two people 
of opposite sexes, same-sex marriage may be effectively precluded. 
The Court, however, cannot erase its holdings that, at times, 
contradict its former messages.  Traditions evolve, standards erode, 
and societies adapt to new sets of rules.  The eloquent messages of 
Goodridge and Perry dismissing traditional concepts of marriage 
somehow echo the dicta of the Court from four decades ago: 
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of be-
ing sacred.  It is an association that promotes a way of 
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social 
projects.  Yet it is an association for as noble a pur-
pose as any involved in our prior decisions.115 
The Court seemed to indicate that marriage as a fundamental right 
cannot and should not be overcome by societal standards that reflect 
personal morality.  A noble purpose that has been interpreted as a 
fundamental right lacks both nobility and purpose if society can arbi-
trarily pick and choose its recipients.  As the states begin to recognize 
marriage equality for its citizens, the logical progression dictates that 
marriage equality will become the norm.  It seems, on its face, cruel 
and hypocritical to deny members of American society, those who 
dictate society‘s mores, a right as fundamental as the right to marry. 
IV. DISTINGUISHING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 
FROM RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION: CHRISTIAN 
LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
SILENCE 
 
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, groups and 
organizations have sought to exclude others on the basis of a First 
Amendment right of freedom of expressive association.116  Several 
times throughout the period, the Supreme Court has struck down 
 
115 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (emphasis added). 
116 See, e.g., Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Club Int‘l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 539-
41 (1987) (regarding the issue of revoking a rotary club‘s charter because of the inclusion of 
women into the club); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984) (regarding 
the issue of exclusion from a private club based on gender); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 163 (1976) (regarding the issue of exclusion from a private school based on race). 
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claims of freedom of expressive association, asserting that the First 
Amendment could not be used as a cloak for blatant discrimina-
tion.117  Three landmark Supreme Court decisions exemplify the 
Court‘s unwillingness to allow constitutionally sanctioned discrimi-
nation: Runyon v. McCrary, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, and 
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte.  
Runyon involved an attempt to exclude based on race;118 Roberts and 
Duarte challenged attempts at gender discrimination.119  In each of 
these cases, the Respondents justified their actions based on a First 
Amendment right of Free Expressive Association; in essence, they 
argued that inclusion of racial minorities and women would somehow 
alter their associations‘ viewpoints and messages.120  In the 2010 case 
of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a faith-based Christian organ-
ization at the University of California—Hastings College of the Law 
sought to exclude homosexuals for similar purposes.121  In Runyon, 
Roberts, and Duarte, the Court focused on issues of anti-
discrimination to defeat the First Amendment arguments of the Res-
pondents; no such analysis was forthcoming in Martinez.122 
 
117 See, e.g., Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 (stating that the Act in question may ―slight[ly] in-
fringe [up]on Rotary members‘ right of expressive association, [and] that infringement [will 
be] justified because it serves the State‘s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination 
against women.‖); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623, 628 (stating that ―potentially expressive activi-
ties that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact . . . are entitled to 
no constitutional protection.‖); Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (― ‗[I]nvidious private discrimina-
tion may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the 
First Amendment [but] it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections        
. . .  ‘ ‖ (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)). 
118 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 163 (questioning whether federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, proscribes the non-admission of otherwise qualified students into private schools on 
the basis of their race).  The law specifically provides that: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to 
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006). 
119 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612 (―This case requires us to address a conflict between a State‘s 
efforts to eliminate gender-based discrimination against its citizens and the constitutional 
freedom of association asserted by members of a private organization.‖); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 
539 (discussing whether a California statute is in contravention of the First Amendment 
when it requires that a private rotary club admit females). 
120 See discussion infra part IV A (discussing Runyon, Roberts, and Duarte). 
121 130 S. Ct. at 2979-80, 2884. 
122 Id. at 2985-86.  Compare Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (holding in 1976 that enforcement 
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A. The First Amendment Right of Free Association 
 
The First Amendment guarantees specific freedoms with the 
language: ―Congress shall make no law abridging . . . the freedom of 
speech . . . .‖123  The concept of a First Amendment right to free ex-
pressive association, on American soil, grew out of Supreme Court 
interpretations regarding the extension of free speech to include the 
freedom to express oneself through group participation.  Throughout 
the last half-century, the Supreme Court has both visited and broa-
dened the scope of the issue of the Constitutional right to associa-
tion.124  Through the Court‘s interpretation, freedom of association 
for the ―advancement of beliefs and ideas,‖ although not expressly 
written into the First Amendment, fundamentally protects the right to 
belong.125 
In 1976, the Runyon decision represented an instance in which 
a private group sought to exclude another group by asserting its First 
Amendment right of freedom of association.126  Here, a private school 
in Virginia denied admission to a minority student, claiming that its 
students‘ parents enjoyed their constitutionally granted right to advo-
cate their ―belief that racial segregation is desirable.‖127  The Court 
 
of civil rights statutes do not violate the free association rights of groups wishing to exclude) 
and Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (holding in 1984 that a state‘s Human Rights Act forbidding an 
organization to engage in sexual discrimination did not affect the free association rights of 
the organization), with Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (stating that, ―restrictions [on associa-
tional freedom] are permitted only if they serve ‗compelling state interests‘ that are ‗unre-
lated to the suppression of ideas‘ . . . . ‖ (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623)). 
123 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
124 The Court avers that practices protected by the First Amendment further include ―a 
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, 
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.‖  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.  There is no 
specific rule that determines what types of association are afforded constitutional protec-
tions.  Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545.  Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence has opined that 
the right to free association does not only exist in familial relationships, but can also be 
found in those relationships where there are ―deep attachments and commitments to the nec-
essarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of 
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one‘s life.‖  Id. 
(quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20). 
125 CHARLES E. RICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 176-77 (1962) (detailing the many facets 
of the right of expressive association interpreted under the First Amendment). 
126 See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 173. 
127 Id. at 176. 
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wholly rejected the parents‘ assertions that the school at issue was 
private, and that the First Amendment protected private discrimina-
tion, declaring that discrimination received no affirmative constitu-
tional protections.128  Further, the Court held that racial integration 
would, in no way, alter the educational environment.129 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court again 
visited the right of association, and furthered its limitations regarding 
a private organization and the organization‘s attempt to discrimi-
nate.130  In Roberts, a national private civic organization (Jaycees) 
sought to discourage local chapters from accepting female members 
by imposing severe sanctions for admitting them.131  Similar to the 
private school in Runyon, the Jaycees claimed that admitting women 
into an organization designed to encourage the social furtherance of 
men violated its right of free association.132  The Court disagreed; 
holding that, as the ―right to associate for expressive purposes is     
not . . . absolute[,]‖ a state‘s legitimate interest may limit the right.133  
As a result, the Court stated that, even if the free association rights of 
the Jaycees are ―incidental[ly] abridge[ed],‖ the minor infringement 
is outweighed by the state‘s greater purpose to prevent discrimina-
tion.134 
Three years subsequent to Roberts, the issue of exclusion by 
means of free association resurfaced in Duarte.  Here, the directors of 
an exclusively male organization, the Rotary Club, challenged a Cali-
fornia statute that required the club to admit women, claiming the sta-
tute violated its First Amendment rights.135  The Court, in finding 
against the Rotary Club, stated that, similar to Roberts, even if the 
California statute abridged the associational rights of the Rotary 
members, the ―State‘s [more] compelling interest in eliminating dis-
crimination against women[]‖ justified the Court‘s decision.136 
Interestingly, both Runyon and Roberts demonstrated the 




130 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29. 
131 Id. at 614. 
132 See id. at 615. 
133 Id. at 623. 
134 Id. at 628. 
135 Id. at 541 (referring to the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 
(West 1982)). 
136 Id. at 549. 
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expressive association, to allow groups to exclude.  In his impas-
sioned opinion in Roberts, Justice Brennan drew a solid parallel of 
the ―stigmatizing injury‖ that naturally accompanies both racial dis-
crimination and gender-based discrimination.137  The Court repeated-
ly refused to allow permissive exclusion to flow from a First 
Amendment right to free association, perhaps leading to a conclusion 
that the Court would generally reject state-sanctioned discrimination, 
both publicly and privately. 
 
B. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale proved to be the 
exception 
 
The 2000 case of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale138 ushered in 
the new millennium with an unfavorable decision regarding the 
treatment of sexual-orientation based discrimination.  Similar to its 
predecessors Runyon, Roberts, and Duarte, Dale involved a chal-
lenge to overcome a First Amendment claim of a right to exclude.139  
However, the Respondent in Dale was a homosexual, and his chal-
lenge proved unsuccessful.140 
In Dale, a New Jersey based Boy Scouts of America scout-
master, James Dale, admitted his homosexuality while in college.141  
Dale‘s revelation presented problems for the Boy Scout organization 
in that Boy Scouts of America deemed homosexual conduct immor-
al.142  Dale‘s membership was subsequently revoked based on the fact 
that the Boy Scouts ―specifically forbid membership to homosex-
 
137 Id. at 625 (―[The] stigmatizing injury, and denial of equal opportunities that accompa-
nies [the many manifestations of racial discrimination], is surely felt as strongly by persons 
suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of 
their race.‖). 
138 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
139 Id. at 644. 
140 Id. at 644-45, 661. 
141 Id. at 644-45. 
142 Id. at 644.  In 1978, the Boy Scouts‘ Executive Committee offered its position on ―ho-
mosexuality and Scouting.‖  Dale, 530 U.S. at 651.  When posed with the question as to 
whether an openly gay person may be a Scout leader, the organization replied, ―No.  The 
Boy Scouts of America is a private, membership organization and leadership therein is a pri-
vilege and not a right.  We do not believe that homosexuality and leadership in scouting are 
appropriate . . . .‖  Id. at 651-52. 
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uals.‖143  Dale brought suit against the organization, and the New Jer-
sey Superior Court‘s Chancery Division held for the Boy Scouts (―the 
Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation, and that, alter-
natively, the Boy Scouts is a distinctly private group . . . .‖).144 
The Boy Scouts predicated its argument on the holding of 
Duarte, claiming that the Boy Scouts enjoyed a constitutional right   
― ‗to enter into and maintain . . . intimate or private relationships . . . 
[and] to associate for the purpose of engaging in protected      
speech.‘ ‖145  The Appellate Division reversed, and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence regarding the 
group‘s large size and organizational practices renders the Boy 
Scouts‘ assertions of ―intimate association‖ and ―personal or private  
. . . constitutional protection‖ unwarranted.146 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and in a five to four 
decision, reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court.147  The Court fo-
cused on the Boy Scouts claim of freedom of expressive association, 
citing the earlier decisions of both Roberts and Duarte, reaffirming 
that the attempts at exclusion in both these cases could not overcome 
the states‘ legitimate interests to prevent gender-based discrimina-
tion.148  Neither the male members of the Jaycees nor the male mem-
 
143 Id. at 645.  When Dale acknowledged his homosexuality during his freshman year at 
Rutgers University in New Jersey, he joined and eventually became the co-president of the 
Lesbian/Gay Alliance, and, in July 1990, when a local newspaper covered a story about his 
advocacy for gay youth, the Boy Scouts, in a letter, revoked his membership.  Id. at 644-45. 
144 Id. at 645.  The lower court held that New Jersey‘s public accommodation statute was 
inapplicable to a private organization.  Dale, 530 U.S. at 645.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 
reads: 
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to ob-
tain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any 
place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommoda-
tion, and other real property without discrimination because of race, 
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or 
sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only to conditions and 
limitations applicable alike to all persons.  This opportunity is recog-
nized as and declared to be a civil right. 
Id. at 661-62 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2011)). 
145 Dale, 530 U.S. at 646 (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1219 (N.J. 
1999) (alteration in original)). 
146 Id. at 646.  The New Jersey Supreme Court, in addition to finding that the Boy Scouts‘ 
organization was deemed too large to warrant intimate associational rights, ―concluded that 
it was ‗not persuaded . . . that a shared goal of Boy Scout members is to associate in order to 
preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral.‘ ‖  Id. at 647 (quoting Dale, 734 A.2d at 
1223-24) (alteration in original). 
147 Dale, 530 U.S. at 661. 
148 See id. at 655, 657-59 (explaining the Court‘s view that each organization in Roberts 
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bers of the Rotary Club International demonstrated that the inclusion 
of women would interfere with the expression of their ideas.149  Here, 
the Court expressed that, ―[t]he state interests embodied in New Jer-
sey‘s public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intru-
sion on the Boy Scouts‘ rights to freedom of expressive associa-
tion.‖150 
The Court relied on the premises that the Boy Scouts possess 
a right to freely associate, and that the inclusion of a homosexual 
would somehow interfere with that right.  However, by applying the 
First Amendment principles employed in both Roberts and Duarte, 
the Court arrived at the Dale decision through questionable analysis.  
In both Roberts and Duarte, the men‘s clubs at issue expressly 
avowed that each club existed for the furtherance of the ideals of 
young men.151  The holdings in both cases arose from the Court‘s 
finding that a legitimate state‘s interest to eliminate gender discrimi-
nation overcame the right to exclude under the First Amendment, and 
the Court expressed that the inclusion of women in intended all-male 
clubs would not serve to alter the clubs‘ ideas.152  Yet, it seemed in-
tuitively logical that the inclusion of an unintended group (women) 
into these men‘s clubs would arguably somehow alter the ideas and 
viewpoints of the clubs; the Jaycees and the Rotary Club members 
expressly intended to provide clubs for the furtherance of men only.  
Whether it appeared fair to the female gender in no way altered the 
logic of the Respondents‘ arguments. 
In Dale, the Court, in an about face from the ―anti-
discriminatory‖ reasoning in Roberts and Duarte, held that James 
Dale‘s homosexuality would somehow alter the viewpoints of the 
Boy Scouts.153  Yet, the Court failed to reasonably demonstrate the 
ways in which Dale‘s homosexuality would have circumvented the 
 
and Daurte lacked a meritorious claim in which a First Amendment right to Freedom of As-
sociation could be found). 
149 Id. at 657-59. 
150 Id. at 659 (emphasis added). 
151 See Duarte, 481 U.S. at 541 (―Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men.‖); 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612-13 (―The objective of the Jaycees, as set out in its bylaws, is to pur-
sue ‗such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and de-
velopment of young men‘s civic organizations in the United States . . . ‘ ‖ (quoting Brief for 
Appellee at 2, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). 
152 Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29. 
153 Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (―[P]ublic or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization‘s 
expression does not justify the State‘s effort to compel the organization to accept members 
where such acceptance would derogate from the organization‘s expressive message.‖). 
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Scouts‘ viewpoint.154  In both Roberts and Duarte, the Court relied on 
the states‘ important interests to eradicate gender discrimination, 
even though the men‘s organizations at issue were private.155  In 
Dale, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that elimination of dis-
crimination in general (including discrimination against homosex-
uals) constituted a legitimate state interest, even though the Boy 
Scouts of America is private.156  Logic would have indicated that an 
important state interest serves to supersede attempted discriminatory 
exclusion.  Yet, the Supreme Court of the United States held other-
wise.157 
The dissent seemed to follow in a more progressive direction, 
stating that the public had become more accepting of homosexuality 
in recent years.158  Furthermore, the decision in Dale came down a 
mere thirty years after the unofficial recognition of the gay rights 
movement.159  However, the majority seemed unfazed by the dis-
sent‘s assertion of socio-political norms, perhaps painting a forebod-
ing picture for future decisions.  Dale essentially defied the Court‘s 
historical tendency to adapt the Constitution to the socio-political 
climate of the day.160  Dale’s unfavorable decision for the gay rights 
 
154 Essentially, the Court claimed only that Dale‘s inclusion would impair the Boy Scout‘s 
right to exercise its position on homosexuality, but offered no concrete rationale concerning 
specifically how Dale would have impaired the Scout‘s organization.  See id. at 653.  The 
Court stated: 
As we give deference to an association‘s assertions regarding the nature 
of its expression, we must also give deference to an association‘s view of 
what would impair its expression . . . .  That is not to say that an expres-
sive association can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply 
by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group 
would impair its message.  But here Dale, by his own admission, is one 
of a group of gay Scouts who have ―become leaders in their community 
and are open and honest about their sexual orientation.‖ 
Id. 
155 See Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (stating that regulations prohi-
biting gender discrimination, which are narrow in scope and unrelated to the repression of 
ideas, may place limitations on the right of association to serve a legitimate state interest). 
156 Dale, 530 U.S. at 647. 
157 Id. at 654-55. 
158 Id. at 699-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
159 See Matzner, supra note 21. 
160 See Christopher J. Tyson, At the Intersection of Race and History: The Unique Rela-
tionship between the Davis Intent Requirement and the Crack Laws, 50 HOW. L. J. 345, 354 
(2007) (referring to the timeline of events that preceded Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976), a case which challenged the racially discriminatory effects of the Washington, D.C. 
Police Department‘s hiring exam).  Tyson wrote: 
[A] major social upheaval forever alters the balance of racial power and 
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movement perhaps indicated that the LGBT community remained far 
from equal in the eyes of the Supreme Court. 
 
C. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: The 2010 
Term’s Missed Opportunity? 
 
The Supreme Court‘s opportunity to overcome its discrimina-
tory ruling in Dale arrived during the 2010 Term with Christian Le-
gal Society v. Martinez, a case fraught with intensely divisive issues 
surrounding First Amendment rights, morality, and discrimination.161  
The Christian Legal Society, a faith-based registered student organi-
zation with local law school chapters throughout the country, sought 
to prevent membership to students whose religious and moral beliefs 
differed from those proscribed by the student organization.162  The 
 
the status of Blacks; organized mass action influences legislation and so-
cial developments that solidify a new social order; a backlash develops 
that quickly adapts its modus-operandi to the new racial discourse and 
conventional wisdom; political and legal contests reflecting the tension 
between the new social order and the backlash increase in number and 
intensify; the Supreme Court intervenes to settle the tension . . . . 
Id.; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-based Social Movements and Public Law, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2001) (discussing the modern meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause especially as a result of modern social movements); Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & 
Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and the March Toward Color-Blind Jurispru-
dence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV 1, 15-18 (2001) (discussing the historical basis and 
the inherent struggle surrounding the passage of the Act); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto 
ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323-24 (2006) (discussing positive changes in the law due to 
women‘s rights movement). 
161 See id. at 2980 (―On October 22, 2004, CLS filed suit against various Hastings officers 
and administrators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Its complaint alleged that Hastings‘ refusal to 
grant the organization RSO status violated CLS‘s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion.  The suit sought injunctive 
and declaratory relief.‖). 
162 Id.  The Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal Society adopted a ―Statement of 
Faith,‖ a tenet by which each member vowed to abide, which read as follows: 
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in: One God, eternally 
existent in three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; God the Father 
Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Chr-
ist, God‘s only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin 
Mary; His vicarious death for our sins through which we receive eternal 
life; His bodily resurrection and personal return; The presence and power 
of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration; The Bible as the inspired 
Word of God. 
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Respondent in this case, the University of California-Hastings Col-
lege of the Law, adopted a strict nondiscrimination policy for regis-
tered student organizations, and interpreted it as a viewpoint-neutral 
―all-comers‖ policy.163  In essence, Hastings, a public university, re-
quired that, for a student organization to gain registered status, the 
organization must not limit membership on the basis of any class pro-
tected against discrimination by California statute.  The ―all-comers‖ 
model was a practice not uncommon among other American law 
schools.164  The Christian Legal Society‘s attempted exclusion of one 
of those protected classes—sexual orientation—became the catalyst 
for this Supreme Court case. 
The Christian Legal Society‘s challenge to the law school‘s 
policy presented a novel situation for Hastings because no registered 
student organization had ever sought an exemption from its directives 
regarding the nondiscrimination policy.165  Consequently, Hastings, 
refusing to accept the student organization‘s argument that the school 
violated its First Amendment free association rights, declined to grant 
the Christian Legal Society its request, and denied the student organi-
zation the many financial benefits attached to other organizations that 
obeyed the policy.166  Hence, Christian Legal Society commenced a 
lawsuit seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief.167  The District 
Court ruled in favor of the law school, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on appeal.168 
Martinez, although argued and eventually settled from a First 
Amendment perspective, examining the right to expressive associa-
 
Id.  The Christian Legal Society expressly sought to exclude those whose religious beliefs 
differed from Christianity, and those who engaged in ―unrepentant homosexual conduct.‖  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
163 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979-80.  The policy states: ―[G]roups must ‗allow any student 
to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless 
of [her] status or beliefs.‘ ‖  Id. at 2979 (alteration in original).  In order to assert the policy‘s 
viewpoint-neutrality, Hastings clarified that the non-discrimination policy ―does not forec-
lose neutral and generally applicable requirements unrelated to status or belief.‖  Id. at 2980, 
n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 See id. at 2979-80 (pointing to several other law school nondiscrimination policies, 
specifically citing the policies adopted at both Georgetown and Hofstra). 
165 Id. at 2980 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
166 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980-81 (explaining that, although Hastings allowed the 
Christian Legal Society to use both its facilities for meetings and its bulletin boards for an-
nouncements, the law school denied the Society official registered student organizational 
status, essentially suspending funding for the organization). 
167 Id. at 2981. 
168 Id. at 2981-82. 
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tion, represented the much broader issue of sexual orientation-based 
discrimination.169  The Hastings Chapter of the Christian Legal Socie-
ty sought exemption from the Hastings nondiscrimination policy as a 
result of the Society‘s amendment of its by-laws.170  In 2004, the So-
ciety adopted a ―Statement of Faith,‖ which required each member to 
abide by specific Christian-based tenets; non-Christians and those 
engaged in ―unrepentant homosexual conduct‖ failed to meet the 
newly established guidelines.171  Therefore, in addition to seeking 
sanctioned discrimination based on religious beliefs, the Society‘s 
expectations encompassed a broader reach; it wished to specifically 
target homosexuals as those whose behavior authorized discrimina-
tion. 
The Supreme Court, in previous decisions involving the deli-
cate balance of the right to free association and the inherent right to 
discriminate, clearly acknowledged that a legitimate state interest to 
enforce nondiscrimination policies outweighs the right of free expres-
sive association.172  In other words, the question arose whether equal 
protection challenges under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
supersede the First Amendment right of free association.  In Marti-
nez, the Court clearly avoided the issue of sexual orientation-based 
discrimination, even though it remained the central issue of the basis 
for the Christian Legal Society‘s claim of free association rights un-
der the First Amendment.  In his concurring opinion in Martinez, Jus-
tice Stevens briefly referred to intolerance of homosexuals in a way 
that approached a comparison to intolerance against Jews, blacks, and 
women.173  Although the possibility surfaced from Stevens' com-
ments to construe a similarity between discrimination of the several 
 
169 See Nan Hunter, Supreme Court Rejects Preferential Treatment for Religious Organi-
zations, HUNTER OF JUSTICE (June 29, 2010, 7:06 AM), http://hunterforjustice.typepad.com 
/hunter_of_justice/christian-legal-society-litigation/ (stating that the Christian Legal Society 
hoped that the Supreme Court would extend the ruling of Boy Scouts v. Dale, which held that 
the Boy Scouts could not be forced to obey state anti-discrimination laws that violated the 
group‘s anti-gay beliefs). 
170 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980. 
171 Id. at 2980. 
172 Compare Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (holding that enforcement of civil rights statutes 
does not violate the free association rights of groups wishing to exclude), and Roberts, 468 
U.S. at 628 (holding that a state‘s Human Rights Act forbidding an organization to engage in 
sexual discrimination did not affect the free association rights of the organization), with Mar-
tinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (stating that, ―restrictions [on associational freedom] are permitted 
only if they serve ‗compelling state interests‘ that are ‗unrelated to the suppression of       
ideas‘ . . . . ‖) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623). 
173 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2998 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
33
Nicodemo: Homosexuals, Equal Protection
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
318 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
groups, the actual allusion never materialized in his concurrence; 
Stevens‘ analogy to other minority groups served only to distinguish 
condonation of intolerance from government financial support of the 
furtherance of intolerance.174  In other words, although the constitu-
tion provides for free speech and free expression, even when the mes-
sages tend to further intolerance, the government need not provide fi-
nancial support to the groups that support messages of intolerance. 
Martinez stands out as a regressive step in a year for which 
the LGBT community witnessed unprecedented progressive gains.175  
Unfortunately, Martinez represented a missed opportunity for the 
Court to address the issue of discrimination, even though the case 
was argued on First Amendment principles.  Interestingly, even 
though the respondents in Runyon, Roberts, and Duarte argued that 
the right of free expressive association justified their exclusionary 
behaviors, the Court explicitly held in each of the cases that the peti-
tioners‘ Equal Protection rights outweighed the respondents‘ rights to 
expressive association.176  The Court‘s reasoning failed to apply to 
Dale, but in Martinez, it never surfaced. 
 
V. SOCIAL PRESSURE, SOCIAL CHANGE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION? 
 
In addition to clearly indicating that specific traditions can 
dictate judicial decision-making,177 the Supreme Court, alluded that 
its decisions reflect rather than dictate the views of society.178  The 
 
174 See id. (stating that a free society must already tolerate groups that discriminate against 
Jews, blacks, and gays, but it should not have to subsidize them). 
175 See Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (holding that ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t 
Tell‖ constitutionally violates the rights of the Log Cabin Republicans); Witt, 739 F. Supp. 
2d at 1316 (holding that ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ did not further a government interest as 
applied to Major Witt, and therefore violated her substantive due process rights); Perry, 704 
F. Supp. 2d at 991 (holding that Proposition 8 violates the fundamental right to marry); Att‘y 
Gen. Holder, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the President has made the determination that 
the Defense of Marriage Act violates equal protection); Hulse, supra note 15 (announcing 
the Senate‘s repeal of ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖).  
176 Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176. 
177 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28, n.6 (stating that the Court was guided by relevant 
tradition); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (stating that judges must look to tradition when decid-
ing whether a right is fundamental). 
178 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127, n.6 (―Because such general traditions provide such 
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Court‘s willingness to adapt to societal changes logically follows a 
necessity on the part of the Court to address issues that arise based on 
the progression of society.  Ours is a fluid and ever-changing culture 
that naturally requires an adaptive constitutional focus, rendering 
those with non-originalist views of the Constitution particularly satis-
fied.179 
It has not been uncommon for major societal changes to even-
tually result in Court decisions that reflect the change, especially re-
garding racial discrimination in the United States during the latter 
half of the twentieth century.180  The decades of the seventies and the 
eighties ushered in the beginnings of the resurgence of the Women‘s 
Rights Movement.181  As society progressed, women began to de-
mand equality outside the home that had previously been enjoyed by 
their male counterparts.182  While the struggle for women‘s rights 
grabbed headlines, the Court followed with decisions that served to 
affirmatively support those rights, especially for protections against 
gender discrimination.183 
 
imprecise guidance, they permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society‘s views.‖). 
179 Non-originalists believe that the Constitution should evolve through interpretation, not 
only by amendment, claiming their view ―is essential so that the Constitution does not re-
main virtually static, so that it can evolve to meet the needs of a society that is advancing 
technologically and morally.‖  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 12. 
180 See Tyson, supra note 170, at 354 (discussing how social upheaval has led to Supreme 
Court intervention). 
181 See The Women’s Movement, COUNTRY STUDIES, http://countrystudies.us/united-
states/history-131.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010) (―During the 1950s and 1960s, increasing 
numbers of married women entered the labor force . . . .  The women‘s movement of the 
1960s and 1970s drew inspiration from the civil rights movement.  It was made up mainly of 
members of the middle class, and thus partook of the spirit of rebellion that affected large 
segments of middle-class youth in the 1960s.  Another factor linked to the emergence of the 
movement was the sexual revolution of the 1960s, which in turn was sparked by the devel-
opment and marketing of the birth-control pill.‖). 
182 See Women’s Strike for Equality, ABOUT.COM (Sept. 27, 2011, 8:20 P.M.) 
http://womenshistory.about.com/ od/feminism/a/strike_for_equality.htm (―Fifty years after 
women were granted the right to vote in the United States, feminists were again taking a 
political message to their government and demanding equality and more political power.  
The Equal Rights Amendment was being discussed in Congress, and the protesting women 
warned politicians to pay attention or risk losing their seats in the next election.‖). 
183 See, e.g., Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 (holding that Equal protection against gender dis-
crimination outweighs a private association‘s right to First Amendment protections); Ro-
berts, 468 U.S. at 628 (holding that Equal protection against gender discrimination out-
weighs a private association‘s right to First Amendment protections); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 
268, 283 (1979) (holding that alimony orders are gender-neutral); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (concluding that, ―by according differential treatment to male 
and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administra-
tive convenience, the challenged statutes violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
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On the night of June 27, 1969, outside a small bar in New 
York‘s West Greenwich Village called Stonewall, a group of brave 
men decided that they deserved equality as citizens.184  From their de-
fiant stance against the police (assigned to arrest them simply because 
they were gay), arose what has arguably become the social movement 
of our time.185  Juxtaposed with the facts regarding anti-gay vi-
olence,186 the prevalence of anti-gay rhetoric,187 and the unwillingness 
of state legislatures to protect members of the LGBT community,188 
concurrent reports reveal American society‘s positive acceptance of 
the LGBT community.189  Additionally, many American allies from 
around the globe have granted equal protections to their LGBT citi-
zens.190 
The courts, the legislatures (including Congress), and Presi-
 
Amendment insofar as they require a female member to prove the dependency of her hus-
band‖). 
184 Matzner, supra note 21. 
185 See Will Hun, The Larger Meaning of the Gay Rights Movement, OHIO.COM (Dec. 18, 
2010) http://www.ohioverticals.com/blogs/akron_law_cafe/2010/12/the-larger-meaning-of-
the-gay-rights-movement/ (―The gay rights movement is the product of nearly every impor-
tant philosophical, social, legal, and intellectual movement of modern times: pragmatic con-
sequentialism, legal realism, the principle of equality, the elimination of gender roles, sexual 
freedom, the free market, economic efficiency, and social Darwinism.‖); Minh T. Nguyen, 
Civil Rights—The History of Gay Rights, ENDERMINH.COM (1999), 
http://www.enderminh.com/minh/civilrights.aspx (―With the rise of gay rights activists, gay-
rights opponents appeared, and the issue about homosexuals‘ rights turned into a controver-
sial, legal battle, which today is still fought with neither party entirely winning.‖). 
186 See Johnson, supra note 45 (reporting 1,617 sexual-orientation based hate crimes in 
2008, as opposed to 1,171 in 2005); Raymond Chase Commits Suicide, supra note 47 (re-
porting the suicide of a young gay man). 
187 See Arkawy, supra note 48 (discussing recent anti-gay rhetoric, such as politicians de-
nouncing homosexual lifestyles). 
188 See Head, supra note 43 (discussing how some states allow civil unions between same-
sex partners, but that these unions lack the deeper meaning associated with a marriage); 
Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, supra note 44 (discussing the 
six states that allow gay marriage, as well as the states that offer legal alternatives). 
189 See Paolo Ramos, Social Support of Gays Ahead of Politics, FIUSM.COM (Mar. 22, 
2011), http://fiusm.com/2011/03/22/social-support-of-gays-ahead-of-politics/ (stating that 
the increasing social acceptance of gays is not being mirrored in the political sphere); Linda 
Carroll, Gay Families More Accepted than Single Moms, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 15, 2011 8:59 
A.M.), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42078511/ns/health-kids_and_parenting/ (reporting 
that Americans are becoming accustomed to and accepting of gay families); Frank Newport, 
American Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Continue to become More Tolerant, GLAPN.ORG 
(June 4, 2001), http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/usa/usnews32.htm (revealing statistics 
regarding the positive attitudes toward gays as of 2001). 
190 See Sheri Stritof & Bob Stritof, Same-Sex Marriage FAQ—Gender Neutral Marriage 
Laws, ABOUT.COM (revealing that, as of 2011, nine other countries, beginning with the Neth-
erlands in 2001, currently allow same-sex marriage).   
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dent Obama have clearly indicated progressive attitudes and have 
taken positive action for members of the LGBT community in the 
years 2010 and 2011.191  The movement to secure basic civil rights 
continues much stronger in the wake of the recent victories.  The nat-
ural progression indicates that the Supreme Court, the final arbiters in 
the granting of constitutional protections, may soon take action. 
 
VI. QUASI-SUSPECT OR QUASI-OPTIMISTIC: LOOKING AHEAD 
 
Where does the LGBT community stand?  Are we perched 
with our backs to the past and our heads pointed affirmatively toward 
the future?  Have the strides of the past two years somehow over-
come the setbacks?  Perhaps a look at the recent past will provide 
adequate assurances that, in the future, the LGBT community will 
prevail as equals.  Relatively speaking, the LGBT community has re-
cently witnessed significant events that have served to fuel a cautious 
optimism that the Supreme Court will soon address the issue of equal 
protection. 
Perhaps I tend to be a foolish optimist that sees a glass half 
full.  Perhaps I incorrectly misinterpreted the machinations of a well-
intentioned Presidential Administration, and I expect entirely too 
much from a politically motivated Congress and a stagnant Supreme 
Court.  However, I look to the future with promise for the members 
of the LGBT community.  There were undoubtedly periods in our re-
cent history when members of the African-American community and 
those who emigrated from other nations optimistically gazed into a 
future that promised equality for them.  I envision a day in the not too 
distant future when constitutional scholars and practitioners opine 
about whether the federal courts correctly applied the newly enun-
ciated heightened standard of review for sexual orientation-based dis-
crimination, as opposed to whether a heightened standard should be 
 
191 See Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (holding that ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t 
Tell‖ constitutionally violates the rights of the Log Cabin Republicans); Witt, 739 F. Supp. 
2d at 1316 (holding that ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ did not further a government interest as 
applied to Major Witt, and therefore violated her substantive due process rights); Perry, 704 
F. Supp. 2d at 991 (holding that Proposition 8 violates the fundamental right to marry); Att‘y 
Gen. Holder, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that the President has made the determination that 
the Defense of Marriage Act violates equal protection); Hulse, supra note 15 (announcing 
the Senate‘s repeal of ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖).  
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applied at all.  I fervently await a time in which LGBT citizens enjoy 
the fundamental rights and equal protections guaranteed by the Con-
stitution.  I predict that, if the current climate outlined in this paper 
continues to move in a progressive direction, the time is within reach.  
Our nation has developed into one that bestows specific fundamental 
rights upon its deserving citizens by limiting governmental interfe-
rence with those rights.  No upstanding citizen should be denied 
access to fundamental rights as well as equal protections under the 
Constitution.  That is my wish.  That is my America.192 
 
 
192 The disposition of the current appeal in Perry v. Schwarzenegger is as follows: oral 
arguments for the appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began December 6, 2010.  
Dante Atkins, The Return of Perry v. Schwarzenegger: The Appeal, DAILY KOS (Dec. 6, 
2010, 4:25 P.M.).  On January 4, 2011, the court denied intervention on the part of 
defendant-intervenors, claiming they had no Article III standing in the case.  Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, Nos. 10-16752 & 10-16696—Update on the Ninth Circuit Proposition 8 
Case, RECORD ON APPEAL (Jan. 5, 2011,  9:17 A.M.) http://www.recordonappeal.com/ 
record-on-appeal/2011/01/perry-v-schwarzenegger-nos-10-16752-10-16696-update-on-
ninth-circuit-proposition-8-case.html).  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals needed to clarify 
the following question regarding another defendant-intervenor, ProjectMarriage.com – Yes 
On 8, A Project of California Renewal, as official proponents of Proposition 8: 
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California Constitution, or 
otherwise under California law, the official proponents of an initiative 
measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative‘s validity 
or the authority to assert the State‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity, 
which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative 
upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when 
the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so. 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011); see also, David Dayen, 9th 
Circuit Asks CA Supreme Court to Rule in Standing on Prop 8 Case, FIRE DOG LAKE NEWS 
DESK (October 12, 2011 10:13 A.M.), http://news.firedoglake.com/2011/01/04/9th-circuit-
asks-ca-supreme-court-to-rule-on-standing-in-prop-8-case/. 
  On November 17, 2011, the California Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: 
In a post[-]election challenge to a voter-approved initiative measure, the 
official proponents of the initiative are authorized under California law 
to appear and assert the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity and to 
appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the public officials 
who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment decline to 
do so. 
Perry v. Brown, No. S189476, 2011 WL 5578873 at *3 (Cal. 2011).  As of January 1, 2012, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has asked each party to submit briefs regarding the con-
stitutionality of Proposition 8; no decision has been reached.  See 
http://hunterforjustice.typepad.com/ files/prop8_media_announce.pdf. 
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